Aquinas, Analogy and the Trinity by Chua, Reginald Mary
 
This is the post-peer reviewed version of the following article: 
Chua, Reginald Mary. “Aquinas, Analogy and the Trinity,” Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy, forthcoming.  
Please cite only the published version. 
  
 
Aquinas, Analogy and the Trinity  
Reginald Mary Chua 
 
ABSTRACT: In this paper I argue that Aquinas’ account of analogy provides 
resources for resolving the prima facie conflict between his claims that (1) the 
divine relations constituting the persons are “one and the same” with the divine 
essence; (2) the divine persons are really distinct, (3) the divine essence is abso-
lutely simple. Specifically, I argue that Aquinas adopts an analogical under-
standing of the concepts of being and unity, and that these concepts are implicit 
in his formulation of claims about substance and relation in the Trinity. I then 
show how Aquinas appeals to key structural features of analogical concepts, no-
tably, the simpliciter/secundum quid characterization, to resolve apparent conflicts 
between the unity of substance and distinction of relations in the Trinity.  
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1. Introduction 
Aquinas provides little by way of explicit guidance in resolving tensions which 
emerge between the following claims in his account of the Trinity:1 
 
 
1 My citations of Aquinas’ works employ the following abbreviations:  
DV   Quaestiones disputatae de veritate  
DP  Quaestiones disputatae de potentia  
In Meta. In duodecim libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio  
In Sent. Scriptum super libros sententiarum  
Quodl.  Quaestiones de quolibet  
SCG  Summa contra gentiles  
ST  Summa theologiae  
All translations are mine, although I have consulted other English translations, adopt-
ing or changing their wording freely (see bibliography for details of the relevant editions 
and translations). 
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1.  The divine relations, which constitute the persons, are ‘one and the 
same’ (unum et idem) with the divine essence;2  
2. There are real distinctions between the Trinitarian relations, consti-
tuting the distinctions between the divine persons;3  
3. The divine essence is absolutely simple.4  
 
These claims have been regarded by a number of commentators as something 
of an aporetic cluster,5 thereby raising questions about the overall coherence of 
Aquinas’ Trinitarian theology. In what follows, I will call (1)-(3) the Trinity claims 
and the challenge of providing a jointly consistent reading of the Trinity claims 
the problem of coherence.  
 In his discussions of the Trinity claims, Aquinas surprisingly seems to give 
little attention to the problem of coherence. For instance, commenting on Aqui-
nas’ discussion in Summa Theologiae I.3.28, Karen Kilby writes: 
[Aquinas] has laid things out in such a way as to make a problem 
more or less leap off the page at us – how can two things be 
absolutely identical with a third, and yet not identical with each 
other? – but he seems hardly to think it worth commenting on.6 
 
2 ST I.28.2.  
3 ST I.28.3.  
4 ST I.3.7. 
5 I take an aporetic cluster to be “a set of individually plausible propositions which is 
collectively inconsistent” (Rescher, Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range, and Resolution, 2nd ed. 
[Chicago: Open Court, 2001], 5). For discussion of the Trinity claims with reference to 
the problem of coherence, cf. Christopher Hughes, On A Complex Theory of a Simple God: 
An Investigation in Aquinas’ Philosophical Theology (London: Cornell University Press, 1989), 
153–66;  James E. Dolezal, “Trinity, Simplicity and the Status of God’s Personal Rela-
tions,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 16 (2014), 79–98; R.T. Mullins, The End 
of the Timeless God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 184n87. 
6 Karen Kilby, “Aquinas, the Trinity and the Limits of Understanding,” International 
Journal of Systematic Theology 7 (2005), 422.  
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While there is no shortage of studies on Aquinas’ Trinitarian thought, many 
have neglected the problem of coherence.7 One notable exception is Peter 
Geach’s controversial reading of Aquinas as relative identity theorist, which has 
given rise to its own share of exegetical and philosophical difficulties.8  
 This paper takes an alternative route for examining the problem of coher-
ence in Aquinas’ Trinity claims. I argue that Aquinas’ semantics of analogy pro-
vides important conceptual background which, properly understood, dissolves 
the problem of coherence. Of particular note is Aquinas’ analogical account of 
the concept of unity, and his claim that analogy, strictly speaking, is a form of 
non-univocity.9 It is well-known that Aquinas’ analogical semantics has far-
reaching implications for his understanding of theological language.10 However, 
scholarship has focused almost exclusively on extra-Trinitarian contexts of analog-
ical predication, such as the analogy of being as used of God and of creatures.11 
 
7 The problem of coherence is not treated in a number of recent studies of Aquinas’ 
thought; cf. Gilles Emery, “The Threeness and Oneness of God in Twelfth- to Four-
teenth-Century Scholasticism,” Nova et Vetera 1 (August 2003), 43–74; The Trinitarian 
Theology of St Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Timothy L. 
Smith, Thomas Aquinas’ Trinitarian Theology: A Study in Theological Method (Washington 
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2003).  
8 Geach’s reading has sparked controversy, partly due to the difficulties involved in 
making sense of Aquinas’ claims about identity, on the one hand, and the generally 
peripheral nature of those claims, on the other. Peter T. Geach, “Aquinas,” in Three 
Philosophers (Oxford: Blackwell, 1961), 118. For discussion, cf. Daniel Molto, “The Log-
ical Problem of the Trinity and the Strong Theory of Relative Identity,” Sophia 56 
(2017), 227–45. For readings of Aquinas as absolute identity theorist, cf. Hughes, On A 
Complex Theory of a Simple God; Robert C. Koons, “Divine Persons as Relational Qua-
Objects,” Religious Studies 2 (2018), 1–21.  
9 Note: in what follows, I will use italics to indicate propositions and/or concepts unless 
context dictates otherwise.  
10 Cf. Smith, Thomas Aquinas’ Trinitarian Theology; Gregory P. Rocca, Speaking the Incom-
prehensible God (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2014). 
11 For instance, Gilles Emery discusses the analogical nature of the proper names ‘Fa-
ther,’ ‘Son’ and ‘Holy Spirit’ only as used of God and of creatures (The Trinitarian The-
ology of St Thomas Aquinas, 151–268); Anselm Min likewise discusses the analogy of being 
with regard to the Aristotelian categories as applied to God (Anselm K. Min, “God as 
the Mystery of Sharing and Shared Love: Thomas Aquinas on the Trinity,” in Peter 
Phan [ed.], The Cambridge Companion to the Trinity, [Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011], 90); Rudi Te Velde discusses analogy only as regards the way ‘person’ is 
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By contrast, analogical predication in intra-Trinitarian contexts, such as the anal-
ogy of one as said of a divine relation and of the divine essence, has received 
virtually no attention.12 Admittedly, Aquinas nowhere explicitly invokes the 
word ‘analogy’ in the context of discussions about the persons of the Trinity in 
relation to the divine essence. A key task of this paper, then, will be to make a 
case for the implicit presence of Aquinas’ analogical conception of unity in his 
articulation of the Trinity claims. I will do so by considering the way that an 
analogical understanding of unity not only dissolves the problem of coherence 
but sheds light on key texts concerning the nature of distinction and unity in the 
Trinity.  
 The discussion that follows is divided into two sections. Since my aim is to 
identify analogical unity and distinction in the Trinity, I begin in the first section 
by discussing the conceptual background of Aquinas’ understanding of unity. 
This will consist in a selective overview of Aquinas’ broader analogical seman-
tics, and his account of being. After characterizing Aquinas’ understanding of 
unity against this background, I offer, in the following section, a reconstruction 
of Aquinas’ Trinity claims. I say ‘reconstruction’ because, given the focus of this 
paper, I will follow some aspects of Aquinas’ understanding of the Trinity claims 
much more closely than others. While I take the resulting picture to be very 
much Aquinas’ own, the focus is more or less exclusively on questions concern-
ing the coherence of unity and distinction in the Trinity. Accordingly, I give 
little attention to related issues, such as the ontological implications of Aquinas’ 
account of the divine persons, or the overall plausibility of Aquinas’ Trinity 
 
used of God and creatures (Rudi A. Te Velde, “The Divine Person[s]: Trinity, Person, 
and Analogous Naming,” in Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering [eds.], The Oxford 
Handbook of the Trinity [Oxford University Press, 2012], 1–14). James Dolezal mentions 
analogy only as regards the claim that “we predicate ‘person’ and ‘relation’ univocally 
of God and humans” (Dolezal, “Trinity, Simplicity and the Status of God’s Personal 
Relations,” 88).  
12 The only recent discussion I have been able to find regarding intra-Trinitarian anal-
ogy in Aquinas’ Trinitarian thought is a footnote in Jeffrey E. Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology 
of the Material World: Change, Hylomorphism, and Material Objects (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2014), 53n70.  
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claims.13 My principal argument is that, given Aquinas’ account of analogical 
unity, the problem of coherence as it is usually formulated simply does not arise. 
Of course, this does not rule out other threats to coherence which are internal 
to Aquinas’ analogical understanding of unity and distinction. I suggest that a 
prima facie conflict still arises between Aquinas’ strong doctrine of divine simplic-
ity and his claim that in God there are relational distinctions which constitute 
real distinctions. In the second section of this paper, I argue that Aquinas’ ana-
logical account of concepts such as real distinction allows for a resolution of these 
further difficulties.  
 Some of the observations that follow, especially in regard to the general 
outlines of Aquinas’ analogical semantics and his account of unity, are well 
known and have been offered previously by other commentators. The contribu-
tion of this paper is to explore neglected consequences of Aquinas’ account of 
analogy, and to provide a deeper reading of key texts concerning the coherence 
of Aquinas’ Trinitarian theology. 
 Issues of coherence remain at the fore of contemporary analytic Trinitar-
ian theology. However, while contemporary analytic theologians and philoso-
phers of religion have developed a wide range of metaphysical models to ac-
count for the coherence of the doctrine of the Trinity, questions of analogical 
semantics in a Trinitarian context have been relatively neglected.14 While the 
task of engaging Aquinas with contemporary analytic debates is one that lies 
outside the scope of this paper, the present argument can nevertheless be seen 
 
13 This paper does not evaluate the philosophical or semantic plausibility of Aquinas’ 
views on analogy, nor does it evaluate the philosophical costs and benefits of analogical 
accounts of specific concepts such as being as found in Aquinas’ Trinitarian theology. 
For recent critical discussion of Aquinas’ analogical account of being, cf. Kris McDaniel, 
The Fragmentation of Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 20–21; Christopher 
Hughes, Aquinas on Being, Goodness, and God (London: Routledge, 2015), 14–20. For ar-
gument to the effect that Aquinas’ account of identity is ill-formed, cf. Richard Cross, 
“Resemblance and Identity,” in Christophe Erismann (ed.), On What There Was: Concep-
tions of Being 500-1650, East and West, vol. 3 (Turnhout: Brepols, forthcoming). 
14 This point is echoed by Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World, 53n70.  
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as making a first foray into the relatively unexplored waters of Trinitarian ana-
logical semantics.  
 
2. The analogy of unity 
 
Given that Aquinas defines unity in terms of being, and in turn characterizes being 
within a broader theory of analogical concepts, it will be useful to begin my 
discussion of Aquinas’ understanding of unity with an overview of this broader 
analogical framework, followed by Aquinas’ understanding of being.15 
 
a) Analogical naming 
 
Aquinas uses the term ‘analogy’ in a variety of contexts for varying purposes.16 
Here, I will not focus on Aquinas’ discussions of “analogy” as referring to met-
aphysical phenomena. Rather, for the purposes of this paper, I will focus on 
Aquinas’ understanding of analogy as a conceptual phenomenon describing the 
relationship between any two (or more) concepts which are partially the same 
 
15 Aquinas often draws a distinction between two meanings of unity, that which serves 
as “principle of number,” associated with the category of quantity, thus applying only 
to material, quantitatively measurable things, and that “which is convertible with be-
ing,” which is applicable to God (ST I.11.3 ad 2; I.11.2 corpus). Since the Trinity claims 
are concerned with immaterial divine persons, the discussion of unity in this paper will 
be concerned with the latter notion of unity. 
16 Senses of ‘analogy’ which do not feature in this the argument of this paper include 
analogy understood as the metaphysical phenomenon of proportional likeness (cf. 
Joshua P. Hochschild, “Aquinas’s Two Concepts of Analogy and a Complex Semantics 
for Naming the Simple God,” The Thomist 83 [2019], 155–84), subdivisions of linguistic 
analogy into the models plurius ad unum, unius ad alterum, etc. (cf. E.J. Ashworth, “Analogy 
and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context,” Mediaeval Studies 
54 [1992], 94–135; “Medieval Theories of Analogy,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos-
ophy [2017] <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/analogy-medie-
val/>, and analogy as a phenomenon extending to judgments as well as concepts (cf. 
Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 154–95).  
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in meaning.17 What is it to be partially the same in meaning? To answer this, it 
will be helpful to begin by clarifying terminology, in particular, Aquinas’ three-
fold categorization of terms, or words, into univocal, equivocal and analogical.18 
In one place, Aquinas describes analogical terms as intermediate between the 
other two:  
In univocals one name is predicated of diverse things with com-
pletely the same meaning […] In equivocals however, the same 
name is predicated of diverse things with an entirely different 
meaning […] But in the case of those things which are spoken 
of in the way mentioned previously [i.e. analogically], the same 
name is predicated of various things with a meaning that is 
partly the same and partly different.19  
It is noteworthy that Aquinas’ threefold categorization is not of names consid-
ered absolutely, but rather, of groups of names relative to a given context of predica-
tion.20 Thus, for instance, it is possible to categorize a name in one way with 
respect to a given context of predication (e.g. “bank” as said of a river bank and 
as said of a money bank would be equivocal), but another way with respect to 
another context of predication (e.g. “bank” as said of two different river banks 
would be univocal).21 Accordingly, I will take it for granted that names are ana-
logical in a context-relative way in what follows (and will explicitly specify that 
context if it is unclear).  
 
17 The background of Aquinas’ account of analogy is the well-known Aristotelian ‘se-
miotic triangle’ according to which names (either word-tokens or word-types) function 
as signs of intellectual concepts, which in turn function as likenesses of things. Names 
themselves are linked to their significations, or meanings, purely conventionally: i.e. 
they signify things only as a result of some agent’s action of associating a given utterance 
with (‘imposing’ it upon) a given thing. For Aristotle’s text cf. De Interpretatione 16a3-6; 
for discussion cf. Ashworth, “Medieval Theories of Analogy.”  
18 For the core texts, cf. SCG I.34; cf. DV 2.11 ad 6, 21.4 ad 2, and ST I.13.5.  
19 In Meta. XI.3.4. 
20 For a detailed Thomistic presentation of univocity, equivocity and analogy conceived 
as dyadic (or polyadic) relationships between pairs (or n-tuples) of homonymous word-
tokens, cf. I.M. Bocheński, “On Analogy,” The Thomist 11 [1948], 424–47. 
21 For Aquinas’ discussion of a context-sensitive case, cf. ST I.13.5 obj. 1 & ad 1. 
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 It is also worth noting that Aquinas’ threefold distinction between uni-
vocity, equivocity and analogy is purely linguistic in nature, identifying a fea-
tures of names or word-tokens and their meanings. However, it can be extended 
more or less to the kinds of relationships obtaining between concepts and their 
conceptual contents. In this extended sense, it will be helpful to characterize 
univocals and equivocals as concepts which, in a given context, have exactly the 
same informational content, and entirely different content, respectively:22  
  
(i) Univocity: two concepts are univocal just in case their informational content is 
exactly the same. 
(ii) Equivocity: two concepts are equivocal just in case their informational content 
is entirely different.  
 
Analogical concepts can be negatively characterized as those which, in a given 
context, are non-univocal and non-equivocal, i.e. satisfying (iii) and (iv):  
 
(iii) Non-univocity: two concepts are non-univocal just in case their informational 
content is not exactly the same. 
(iv) Non-equivocity: two concepts are non-equivocal just in case their informational 
content is not entirely different.  
 
 
22 By “informational content” I mean a feature or features serving to ground objective 
similarity. These features (whether substantial essences, proper accidents, or otherwise) 
need not be universals in the Platonic realist sense of extra-mentally existing universals, 
wholly present in multiple things; Aquinas takes them to be more akin to tropes, i.e. 
features existing only as particulars (cf. In Sent. II.17.1.1 corpus). For discussion of com-
mon natures as “distinct realizations of the same information-content,” cf. Gyula 
Klima, “The Medieval Problem of Universals,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(2017) <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/universals-medie-
val/>. For discussion of common natures with reference to trope theory, cf. Jeffrey E. 
Brower, “Aquinas on the Problem of Universals,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
92 (2015), 715–35.  
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Let us now consider partial sameness of meaning. It will be useful to begin, by 
way of contrast, with what we might call a compositional analysis of analogy.23 On 
this view, partial sameness of meaning occurs when two complex concepts pick 
out different but overlapping features, with the overlapping features correspond-
ing to an overlapping conceptual part shared by each of the two concepts. These 
concepts are partially different in virtue of each having some conceptual part(s) 
not shared by the other, and partially the same in virtue of having at least some 
shared conceptual part(s). The shared conceptual part(s) can be thought of as an 
underlying univocal concept present in each of the two analogically related con-
cepts. On this view, for instance, “God is a being” and “Fido is a being” involve 
analogically different concepts of being respectively (call them being1 and being2) 
just in case they are complex concepts each with some conceptual parts not 
shared by the other (e.g. infinite as part of being1 and finite as part of being2), and at 
least one underlying univocal concept, being3, such that being3 can be truly said, 
univocally, of both God and Fido.24 
 Aquinas does not advance a compositional analysis of analogy. While 
Aquinas does hold that one and the same underlying concept can be found in 
univocal terms, “just as animal is found in each species of animal,”25 analogical 
predication, by contrast, does not appear to involve any such shared underlying 
concept, even implicitly:  
 
23 This view has been attributed to John Duns Scotus (cf. Ordinatio I.3.1; Richard Cross, 
Duns Scotus: Great Medieval Thinkers [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999], 33–38). 
Scotus is sometimes described as denying outright “the semantic possibility of analogi-
cal signification” (Joshua P. Hochschild, The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan’s De 
Nominum Analogia [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010], 138). I 
take Scotus’ view to constitute a genuine account of analogy, understood as the con-
ceptual phenomenon whereby concepts are partly the same and partly different. For 
another reading of analogy (attributed to Heidegger) paralleling in some respects the 
compositional analysis given here, cf. McDaniel, The Fragmentation of Being, 18–27. 
24 For discussion, cf. Richard Cross, “Duns Scotus and Analogy: A Brief Note,” The 
Modern Schoolman 89 (2012), 147–54. 
25 ST I.16.6 corpus. 
 10 
[W]hen anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is 
found in only one of them according to its proper concept (pro-
priam rationem), and from this one the rest are denominated. So 
health is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not 
because health exists [elsewhere] except in the animal only; but 
from the health of the animal, medicine is called healthy, insofar 
as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, insofar as 
it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine 
nor in urine, nevertheless in the one there is something in virtue 
of which it effects health, while in the other, something in virtue 
of which it is a sign of health.26  
The account of analogical sameness of meaning given in this passage has been 
aptly described as ‘source-dependent’ unity,27 because on this view, analogically 
related terms derive their semantic unity from dependence relationships be-
tween the analogates and a common source (in this case, the health of an ani-
mal). The dependence relationships need not be of the same sort: the urine’s 
health depends on the animal’s health as significans depends upon significandum, 
whereas the medicine’s health depends on the animal’s health as an agent de-
pends upon a patient. As Aquinas puts it, “To be a sign and to be a cause are 
different things. But health is one.”28 In what follows, I will take source-depend-
ence to be an intelligible analysis of analogical semantic unity. What is im-
portant to note here is that, in contrast to the compositional analysis, the source-
dependence analysis does not involve positing a feature or underlying univocal 
concept shared by the analogous concepts of health. As Aquinas puts it, “health 
is neither in medicine nor in urine.” 
 
26 ST I.16.6 corpus. Cf. In Meta. XI.3.4. 
27 This is Christopher Shields’ term for Aquinas’ account of analogy (cf. Shields, Order 
in Multiplicity: Homonymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999], 106n126). For discussion of the closely related Aristotelian phenomenon of πρός 
ἑν equivocity, cf. Heike Sefrin-Weis, “Pros Hen And The Foundations Of Aristotelian 
Metaphysics,” in John J. Cleary and Gary M. Gurtler (eds.), Proceedings of the Boston Area 
Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 24 (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 261–85. 
28 In Meta. XI.3.4. 
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 Aquinas’ source-dependence analysis does not constitute an explicit rejec-
tion of a compositional analysis. Nevertheless, in what follows, I will take it to 
imply that Aquinas does not regard analogical predication, of itself, as (even 
implicitly) postulating a univocal concept underlying the analogical concepts.29 
We will return to these features of analogy in our evaluation of Aquinas’ Trinity 
claims. However, before doing so, let us turn to Aquinas’ account of being and 
unity. 
 
b) The analogy of being 
 
Aquinas explicitly contrasts his own account of being with a univocal account 
which he attributes to Parmenides and Melissus. According to Aquinas, they 
were “deceived” into adopting ontological monism, i.e. “that being is one,” be-
cause of a faulty prior assumption: “they treated being as one in concept and 
one in nature, like the nature of any genus.”30 Against this view, Aquinas affirms 
that being is one neither in concept nor in nature, and furthermore, that being 
is not a genus “but is said in many ways of different things.”31 These claims 
 
29 My view thus differs from Jeffrey Brower’s recent reading of Aquinas as endorsing a 
univocal concept of being underlying the ten analogically unified Aristotelian categories 
of being. According to Brower, being is a single ontological type whose “subtypes include 
substance and accident” (Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World, 5). As Domenic 
D’Ettore has shown, a number of Thomists in the commentatorial tradition (including 
Paul Soncinas and Chrysostom Javelli), motivated by Scotist arguments, have also at-
tributed to Aquinas a similar kind of implicit univocal theory of analogical unity, ac-
cording to which, underlying any plurality of analogical concepts “there is one concept 
numerically for the diverse analogates, just as a numerically one concept signifies uni-
vocals” (Domenic D’Ettore, Analogy after Aquinas [Washington D.C.: Catholic University 
of America Press, 2018], 179). Readers following Brower’s or Soncinas’ readings of 
Aquinas will thus be unable to endorse key aspects of my analogical reading of Aquinas’ 
Trinity claims. Insofar as my argument successfully accounts for the coherence of Aqui-
nas’ Trinity claims, it can be seen as revealing a further advantage of the non-univocal 
exegetical tradition of Aquinas’ understanding of analogy taken by Herveaus Natalis, 
Thomas Sutton and others (cf. D’Ettore, Analogy after Aquinas, 187). 
30 In Meta. I.9.6. Cf. also In Sent. II.17.1.1 corpus. 
31 In Meta. I.9.6. Cf. also In Sent. II.34.1.1 corpus. Elsewhere, Aquinas uses this phrase 
when explicitly rejecting univocity, saying that being is “said in many ways, and not uni-
vocally” (In Meta. I.17.7, emphasis added).  
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rejecting univocity are so far compatible with both an equivocal and an analog-
ical account of being. However, Aquinas elsewhere makes clear that he also re-
jects an equivocal account of being, characterizing the different meanings of being 
not as wholly different but rather unified by source-dependence.32 For instance, 
in his commentary on Metaphysics 11, immediately after describing analogy in 
terms of the paradigmatic case of health, Aquinas gives being as a further instance 
of an analogical concept: 
The same holds true regarding the many ways in which being is 
said; for being simpliciter is said to be that which has existence in 
itself, namely, substance; but other beings are so called because 
they are of that which exists in itself: either attributes, or habits, 
or anything else of this sort. For a quality is called a being, not 
because it itself has existence, but because a substance is said to 
be disposed by it. And so it is similarly with other accidents. This 
is why he says that they are of a being. And thus it is evident that 
the multiplicity of being has something common to which it is 
reduced.33  
It is noteworthy that Aquinas characterizes one primary kind of being, namely 
substance, as being simpliciter. An accident such as quality is a being insofar as “a 
substance is said to be disposed by it,” but this does not imply that “it itself has 
existence”—only a substance is said to have “existence in itself,” and hence can 
be called a being simpliciter. Elsewhere, in his commentary on Sentences II.42.1, 
Aquinas describes this distinction between unqualified and qualified predication 
of being as a key identifying feature of analogical concepts more generally: 
There is a dual way of dividing what is common into what is 
under it, just as there is a dual way of being common. There is 
a division of a univocal [concept] into species, according to the 
 
32 Aquinas elsewhere (In Meta. XI.3.1) rejects an equivocal account of being partly on 
the grounds that such an account would render impossible the discipline of metaphysics 
(the study of “being in common”).  
33 In Meta. XI.3.4. 
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differences by which the nature of the genus is equally partici-
pated in by the species, as animal divides into man and horse, and 
so on. But the other division concerns that which is common by 
analogy, which is predicated from one of the members accord-
ing to its perfect concept (perfectam rationem), and from another, 
imperfectly and in a qualified way (secundum quid), as being divides 
into substance and accident, and into actual being and potential being: 
and this division is like an intermediate between the equivocal 
and the univocal.34 
Here, Aquinas takes the predication of being of substance and of accident, as an 
example of the general contrast between analogical predication simpliciter (“ac-
cording to its perfect concept”) and secundum quid (“imperfectly and in a qualified 
way”). For Aquinas, this division is a sufficient marker of analogical predication, 
since the secundum quid qualification has no place in univocal predication: rather, 
every predication is according to the univocal concept in one and the same way. 
On the other hand, in equivocal predication, there is no secundum quid qualifica-
tion for a different reason: equivocity disallows commonality of meaning, which 
is implied in the comparison between predication simpliciter and secundum quid. 
Following Aquinas’ terminology, in what follows I will refer back to this division 
as the simpliciter/secundum quid characterization.   
 The question of what ontological implications follow from the sim-
pliciter/secundum quid characterization of being, is a matter of debate.35 To reiter-
ate, it is not my purpose here to evaluate the plausibility of Aquinas’ account of 
 
34 In Sent. II.42.1.3 corpus. For another discussion of this passage, cf. Klima, “Aquinas 
on One and Many,” Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale, 11 (2000), 195-
215.  
35 For a reading of Aquinas according to which substances “are the only things that 
properly and truly exist,” cf. Robert Pasnau, “On What There Is in Aquinas,” in Jeffrey 
Hause (ed.), Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae: A Critical Guide, (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2018), 10–28. For a more liberal reading which admits accidents into 
Aquinas’ “ultimate categories of being,” cf. Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material 
World, 47-54. 
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being.36 What is important to note for present purposes, however, is that Aquinas’ 
understanding of ‘being simpliciter’ is distinctive when compared to understand-
ings of that term given contemporary univocal assumptions about being.37 On 
such assumptions, ‘being simpliciter’ amounts to being understood in an unre-
stricted sense, considered independently of any given category of being and en-
compassing all such categories.38  By contrast, for Aquinas, ‘being simpliciter’ is 
being under the category of substance. Indeed, for Aquinas, the distinction be-
tween simpliciter and secundum quid does not countenance any overarching sense 
of category-independent being. Aquinas’ position is also distinctive compared to 
contemporary analogical accounts of being which, although acknowledging par-
tially different meanings of being, seek to posit an underlying concept unifying 
those different meanings, one that is thus univocal and category-independent.39 
In contrast to these accounts, Aquinas does not affirm any univocal category of 
being encompassing substance, quality, and relation as subcategories. For Aqui-
nas, being has univocal application only within a given category (e.g. substance or 
quality). 
 
36 Michael Loux has argued that without a univocal account of being, it becomes impos-
sible to even state the categories according to which “being is said in many ways” (Mi-
chael J. Loux, “Being, Categories, and Universal Reference in Aristotle,” in Lila 
Haaparanta & Heikki Koskinen (eds.), Categories of Being [New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012], 28). Loux is objecting to the understanding of being as non-univocal, as 
he finds it in Aristotle. It seems that a similar objection could be raised for the non-
univocal interpretation of being attributed to Aquinas in this paper. 
37 Contemporary proponents of univocal being include George Molnar, who claims that 
“‘existence’ is univocal, in that although there are different types of thing which exist, 
there is only one type of existence” (George Molnar, Powers, ed. Stephen Mumford 
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003], 21). Many contemporary defenders of the 
univocity of being draw inspiration from Quine’s claim that “to be is, purely and simply, 
to be the value of a variable” (W.V.O. Quine, “On What There Is,” Review of Metaphysics 
2 [1948], 32). For a different reading of Quine as “really a deflationist about ontological 
issues,” cf. Huw Price, Naturalism without Mirrors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 285. 
38 Arguably, this is implicit in David Lewis’s claim that “When we quantify over less 
than all there is, we leave out things that (unrestrictedly speaking) exist simpliciter” (David 
K. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds [Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1986], 3).  
39 For an account of Heidegger’s understanding of the analogy of being which posits 
such an underlying concept, cf. McDaniel, The Fragmentation of Being, 18–27. 
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c) The analogy of unity  
 
Aquinas defines unity in terms of being: “this definition of unity is true: unity is 
being that is undivided.”40 As such, it is not surprising that the analogical char-
acteristics of being mentioned above find their way into unity. For instance, unity 
is non-generic: “unity cannot be a genus, insofar as being cannot be either, be-
cause it is not predicated univocally.” Unity also has categories derived from 
those of being: 
[S]ince being and unity signify the same thing, and the species 
of things that are the same are themselves the same, there must 
be as many species of being as there are of unity, and they must 
correspond to each other.41  
By “species of being,” Aquinas has in mind “substance, quantity and quality and 
so on.”42 Since these categories of being are related analogically, it is natural to 
suppose that Aquinas treats the categories of unity as analogically related in the 
same way. Aquinas makes this explicit in his commentary on Metaphysics 7, 
where he makes the point that unity, like being, is based upon the core notion of 
substance:  
‘One’ is said in many ways, just as ‘being’ is. In one sense, ‘being’ 
signifies this particular thing, and in another, quantity, and in 
another, quality, and so on for the other categories. Yet it is 
predicated primarily of substance and secondarily of the other 
 
40 In Sent. I.24.1.3 ad 3; cf. also In Meta. X.4.2, ST I.11.1 corpus. This definition might 
give the impression that unity picks out a subclass of being (namely, the undivided be-
ings), but, as Aquinas elsewhere makes clear, the notion of undividedness he has in 
mind is one that holds not just of some beings, but of every being, considered absolutely: 
“There is a negation consequent upon every being considered absolutely: its undivid-
edness, and this is expressed by unity” (DV I.1 corpus). For Aquinas’ claim that unity 
adds no reality to being, differing only conceptually from it, cf. In Meta. IV.2.13. 
41 In Meta. IV.2.14.  
42 In Meta. IV.2.14.  
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categories. Therefore the term ‘one’ simpliciter will apply primar-
ily to substance and secondarily to the other categories.43 
Aquinas’ multivocal characterization (“said in many ways”) and simpliciter/secun-
dum quid characterization (“primarily” in terms of substance and “secondarily of 
the other categories) of unity is thus remarkably close in structure to that of being.  
 These features of Aquinas’ characterization of unity extend to plurality and 
distinction, concepts which Aquinas regards as opposed to unity.44 For Aquinas, 
plurality is closely tied to unity in that it adds nothing other than a negation: 
whereas unity adds nothing but ‘indivisibility’ to being, plurality adds nothing but 
‘a certain division’ or ‘distinction’ to unity:  
[M]ultitude corresponding to [unity] adds this to the things de-
scribed as many: that each of them is one, and that each of them 
is not the other, and in this lies the essence of distinction (ratio 
distinctionis). Accordingly then, while unity adds to being one nega-
tion inasmuch as a thing is undivided in itself, multitude adds two 
negations, inasmuch as a certain thing is undivided in itself, and 
divided from another; i.e. one of them is not the other.45 
For Aquinas, the relationship between unity and plurality parallels the relationship 
between being and non-being. For instance, in Aquinas’ discussion of the relation-
ship between unity and plurality in Summa Theologiae I.11.2, Aquinas begins by 
first discussing the way in which being can coexist with privation. Aquinas’ first 
point is effectively that privation is not non-being simpliciter but rather non-being 
only secundum quid: as he puts it, “no privation negates existence completely” but 
simply negates “some existence or other.”46 Aquinas then generalizes, stating 
 
43 In Meta. VII.4.10; cf. ST I-II.17.4 corpus.  
44 Aquinas uses terms besides ‘plurality’ (pluralitas), including ‘number’ (numerus) and 
‘multitude’ (multitudo), more or less interchangeably, in numerous contexts when dis-
cussing plurality in God (e.g. In Sent. I.24.1.2 corpus). In what follows, I will focus on 
‘plurality.’ 
45 DP 9.7 corpus; cf. ST I.11.2 ad 4. 
46 ST I.11.2 ad 4. 
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that “what holds for being also holds for one and good  insofar as they are convert-
ible with being.”47 After this general claim, Aquinas makes explicit the sim-
pliciter/secundum quid characterization to illustrate his point:  
For example, something that is a being secundum quid—as, e.g., a 
being in potentiality—is not a being simpliciter, i.e., a being in 
actuality. Again, something that is a being simpliciter in the genus 
of substance is not a being secundum quid, i.e., something with ac-
cidental being. Similarly therefore, what is good secundum quid is 
evil simpliciter, or vice versa. And, likewise, something that is one 
simpliciter is many secundum quid, and vice versa.48 
In this passage, Aquinas’ claims about the structural parallel between being and 
unity are extended to the concept of plurality. Just as the analogical structure  of 
being allows for it to be said in many ways, likewise it allows for being and non-
being to be opposed in many ways. Similarly, the analogical structure of unity 
allows for unity and plurality to be opposed, and to coexist, in many ways.   
 Given that plurality is defined in terms of distinction, the claim that plu-
rality admits of an analogous simpliciter/secundum quid characterization suggests 
that distinction (or division)49 admits of a similarly analogical characterization. In 
his commentary on Sentences I.24.1, Aquinas makes this point explicit:  
Just as the definition of unity consists in indivisibility, so the def-
inition of number or of multitude consists in a certain division 
or in a certain distinction (distinctione aliqua). Hence, the things 
that we find divided simpliciter, we say are many simpliciter; and 
 
47 ST I.11.2 ad 4. 
48 ST I.11.2 ad 1. 
49 Strictly speaking, division involves the dividing of a whole into parts (ST I.31.2 corpus); 
diversity involves x having a distinct essence or form from y (cf. In Sent. I.24.1.2 corpus; 
ST I.31.2 ad 1); likewise, difference involves not only x not being y, but furthermore, x 
being different in form from y (cf. ST I.31.2 ad 2). however, Aquinas often uses these 
terms in a looser sense as interchangeable with distinction, as in the passage quoted be-
low.  
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those that we find divided secundum quid, we say are many secun-
dum quid.50 
Once again, the question of what implications follow from these analogical char-
acterizations of unity, plurality and distinction is a matter of debate. What is im-
portant to note for present purposes is that the analogical framework governing 
unity is closely related to that of being. Just as being simpliciter is being under the 
category of substance, likewise, unity simpliciter is substantial unity. Likewise, 
just as neither being simpliciter nor being secundum quid involve a univocal, cat-
egory-independent notion of being, likewise neither unity simpliciter nor unity 
secundum quid involve a univocal, category-independent notion of unity. 
 
3. Analogy in the Trinity claims 
 
So far, I have argued that Aquinas’ conception of unity and distinction shares an 
analogical structure paralleling that of being and health. What remains to be seen 
is whether Aquinas puts this analogical structure to work in his discussions of 
the Trinity claims, and if so, how.  
 Given the dependence of Aquinas’ account of unity and distinction upon 
being, the first question to ask is whether or not Aquinas admits different catego-
ries of being in God. In one sense, creaturely concepts of being do not apply to 
God at all.51 Thus, Aquinas states in some places that God is not a substance in 
the “fully proper” sense of that term, given that substance is a category of cre-
ated being.52 Nevertheless, “in a broad sense” and “analogically,” Aquinas is 
willing to speak of God as substance, insofar as God exists per se and does not 
 
50 In Sent. I.24.1.2 corpus. 
51 For Aquinas’ rejection of the univocal application of creaturely concepts to God, cf. 
ST I.13.1. 
52 Aquinas’ reason is that the name ‘substance’ is taken from that which ‘lies underneath 
accidents,’ and denotes a quiddity which is other than its existence; both of these fea-
tures are proper to created substances only (In Sent. I.8.4.2 ad 1; cf. ST I.3.5 ad 1, SCG 
I.25.10). 
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exist in a dependent way.53 Other categories of being have no application what-
soever to God. For instance, “God is not an accident, simpliciter,”54 given that 
Aquinas regards the unity of God as ruling out all forms of composition, includ-
ing the compositional relationship between a substance and accident.55 How-
ever, for reasons we will consider below, Aquinas holds that relations do not 
posit any accidental being in God, and can thus be said truly of God. As such, 
“there remain only two modes of attribution which apply to divine persons, 
namely that of substance and relation.”56  
 The applicability of substance and relation to God opens the possibility for 
Aquinas to recognize at least two different categories under which unity and 
plurality can be found in God. Aquinas puts these categories to work in his ac-
count of the Trinity claims by defining key concepts in terms of these two cate-
gories.57 One example is Aquinas’ definition of person as “an individual substance 
of rational nature,”58 and his claim that divine persons are individual only in 
virtue of a distinction of relations: “since the divine Persons are not distinguished 
by anything absolute, it is necessary that every distinction between them be ac-
cording to relations of origin.”59 In this way, both substance and relation feature 
in Aquinas’ understanding of divine personhood. As Aquinas puts it: “divine per-
son signifies a relation as subsisting. And this is to signify relation by way of sub-
stance.”60  
 This account of personhood allows Aquinas to treat the question of 
whether there is a plurality of Trinitarian persons as settled on the basis of 
 
53 In Sent. I.8.4.3 corpus. 
54 In Sent. I.8.4.2 ad 1. 
55 In Sent. I.8.4.3 corpus. 
56 In Sent. I.8.4.3 corpus. 
57 For Aquinas’ definition of ‘hypostasis’ in terms which align with his definition of ‘per-
son,’ cf. DP 9.1 corpus. 
58 Aquinas here accepts Boethius’s definition of person (ST I.29.4 corpus); cf. ST I.29.1 
and 3; In Sent. I.25.1.1; DP 9.2. 
59 In Sent. I.11.1.1 corpus. 
60 ST I.29.4 corpus. 
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whether there is “a plurality of real relations in God,”61 and the question of 
whether the divine persons are one God as settled on the basis of whether they 
are one substance.62 
 Key to Aquinas’ understanding of the Trinity claims, then, is his oft-re-
peated claim that relational distinction in God is compatible with substantial 
unity. To take one well-known text, consider this affirmation of the real distinc-
tion of relations in Summa Theologiae I.28.3:  
The very nature of relative opposition includes distinction. 
Hence, there must be real distinction in God, not, indeed, ac-
cording to that thing which is absolute (secundum rem absolutam), 
namely the essence, in which there is supreme unity and sim-
plicity; but rather, according to that thing which is relative (secun-
dum rem relativam).63 
Aquinas clearly does not see even an apparent difficulty in positing a real dis-
tinction between divine relations alongside the “absolute” and “supreme” unity 
of the divine essence. Yet for some recent commentators, this claim appears to 
border on incoherence. How could Aquinas affirm such a distinction alongside 
an affirmation of supreme unity?  
 Aquinas’ analogical account of unity provides a straightforward explana-
tion of why Aquinas does not see even an apparent conflict here. As we have 
seen, Aquinas holds that unity is always unity under a given category, and likewise 
for distinction. Given that substantial unity and relational unity are related as unity 
simpliciter and unity secundum quid, distinction under the category of relation will 
also be distinction secundum quid, posing no threat as such to substantial unity, or 
unity simpliciter (as Aquinas refers to it here, the “supreme unity” of the divine 
essence). As Aquinas would say, plurality and distinction pose no threat to unity 
 
61 ST I.30.1 corpus; cf. ST I.28.3. 
62 Hence, in one place, Aquinas can say: “the one divine substance is common to the 
three Persons: hence Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one God” (DP 7.3 ad 1).  
63 ST I.28.3 corpus. 
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as such, unless it is distinction or plurality under the very same category of being as that 
of the divine substance, which is precisely what is denied here.  
 It is worth acknowledging the structural parallel between this aspect of 
Aquinas’ Trinity claims, and the theory of relative identity attributed to Aquinas 
by Peter Geach. Just as Geach rejects the suggestion that the Trinity claims can 
be adequately formulated as claims about two things being ‘absolutely identical’ 
to a third (at least if this is understood to involve statements of the form ‘x is 
absolutely identical to y’),64 Aquinas’ analogical account of unity avoids the re-
lated assumption that the Trinity claims are adequately formulated with one 
univocal concept of unity or distinction.  
 However, it is worth noting that Aquinas’ account has the resources to 
avoid an objection facing relative-identity readings of the Trinity claims. The 
objection is that relative-identity accounts fail to prevent a reformulation of the 
problem of coherence in terms of the following claims: each divine person is the same 
extra-mental entity as the divine essence, on the one hand, and each divine person is a 
distinct extra-mental entity from the other.65 These claims allow the problem of coher-
ence to arise once more because they are adequately formulated from the per-
spective of relative identity, so long as ‘extra-mental entity’ is considered a legit-
imate count noun.  
 However, this particular reformulation does not pose a threat to Aquinas’ 
account of the Trinity claims. For ‘extra-mental entity’ is either an overarching, 
univocal category of being, or else it is analogical. If it is univocal, then the for-
mulation of the problem involves an assumption implicitly rejected by Aquinas’ 
account of unity, namely, that being is “one in concept.” On the other hand, if 
‘extra-mental entity’ is understood to be analogical and ‘said in many ways,’ 
 
64 For Geach, such identity statements are logically incomplete, unless they are under-
stood as short for ‘x is the same A as y’, where A represents a countable noun—in the 
same way that Aquinas regards ‘x and y are one simpliciter’ to be short for ‘x and y are 
one substance.’ Cf. P.T. Geach, “Identity,” The Review of Metaphysics 21 (1967), 3–12. 
65 This formulation is due to J.T. Paasch, “Aquinas on the Trinity,” in Aquinas’s Summa 
Theologiae: A Critical Guide, ed. Jeffrey Hause (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2018), 68–87. 
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then the claims can be properly understood as each divine person is the same extra-
mental substance as the divine essence and each divine person is a distinct extra-mental relation 
from the other. Thus interpreted, Aquinas would accept both claims, but the ap-
parent inconsistency is dissolved. 
 To sum up, insofar as the problem of coherence posits a conflict between 
distinction and unity as such in the Trinity, the problem simply does not arise for 
Aquinas, given his assumptions about analogical unity. That being said, other 
objections can be formulated for Aquinas’ account which are adequately for-
mulated within the context of his assumptions concerning analogical unity. Here 
I will focus only on two potential objections, one concerning the coherence of 
Aquinas’ claims about the unity and simplicity of the divine essence, the other 
concerning the real distinction of persons.  
 
 
a) Safeguarding simplicity 
 
One potential threat to the coherence of Aquinas’ account of the Trinity claims 
concerns the nature of essential unity. Aquinas’ strong doctrine of divine sim-
plicity is in one place described as the claim that God is “in every way one.”66 
Does this claim (which seems stronger than the claim that God is merely one in 
substance) contradict Aquinas’ claim that relations in God are not one, but in-
stead constitute a really distinct plurality?  
 It is helpful to understand Aquinas’ claim that God is “in every way one” 
in terms of his definition of unity as “being that is undivided.” Given this defini-
tion, Aquinas expresses the doctrine of divine simplicity in terms of both being 
and undividedness: the divine substance is “supremely one” insofar as it is “su-
premely being,” and furthermore, insofar as it is “supremely undivided,” that is 
to say, “divided neither actually, nor potentially, by any mode of division.”67 
 
66 ST I.13.12 corpus. 
67 ST I.11.4 corpus. 
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While Aquinas sometimes uses ‘division’ as a synonym for ‘distinction,’ in this 
context Aquinas is using it in a more narrow sense to mean a division of a whole 
into parts.68 
 For Aquinas, then, the threat of incoherence emerges only if relational 
distinction introduces some kind of composition into God. This is a very real 
threat for Aquinas, given his position that creaturely relations are founded upon, 
and imply the existence of, accidental being in their subject. Since substance-
accident composition is ruled out by the divine simplicity, Aquinas needs to 
show that divine relations pose no risk of introducing such accidental being into 
the Trinity. For Aquinas, this is a key clear desideratum of an account of divine 
relations:   
In us, the relations have a dependent esse because their esse is 
other than the esse of the substance. Hence, they have a proper 
mode of being in their proper nature (ratio), just as happens in 
the case of the other accidents […] This situation, of course, has 
no place in divinity, since there is in God no other esse than that 
of substance, for whatever is in God is substance.69 
Aquinas addresses this potential conflict by articulating an account of divine 
relations on which they clearly constitute no addition of accidental being to 
God. As Aquinas puts it, “from the fact that one posits a relation in God, it does 
not follow that there is in God some dependent esse, but only that there is in God 
a certain directedness (respectus aliquis) in which the essence of relation consists.”70 
Aquinas’ account of divine relations is ontologically minimalist insofar as it does not 
treat relations as, in any sense, an addition of being over and above the divine 
essence. Aquinas can affirm, for instance, that relations in God are “the same in 
reality” with the divine essence, differing from it only conceptually.71 Given the 
 
68 Cf. ST I.31.2 corpus. 
69 SCG IV.14.12. 
70 SCG IV.14.12. 
71 ST I.28.2 corpus. 
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merely conceptual distinction between the relations and the divine essence, 
Aquinas can safely claim that a plurality of relationally distinct persons in God 
poses no threat whatsoever to the unity of the divine essence: 
Person, as above stated, signifies relation as subsisting in the di-
vine nature. But relation as referred to the essence does not dif-
fer as a thing (re), but only conceptually (ratione); while as com-
pared to an opposed relation, it has a real distinction by virtue 
of that opposition. Thus there are one essence and three per-
sons.72 
This passage reveals the utility of Aquinas’ minimalist approach to the ontology 
of relations: by treating relations as the very same thing as the divine esse, differ-
ing only conceptually from it, he can avoid the risk of any apparent conflict 
between divine simplicity and the affirmation of real relations (and relational 
distinction) in God. 
 
 
b) Accounting for real distinction 
 
Aquinas’ ontologically minimalist account of relations brings us to a second po-
tential objection. Given that relations in God are ‘the same in reality’ with the 
divine essence and differ only conceptually from it, does Aquinas’ account of 
relational distinction risk coming into conflict with his affirmation that such a 
distinction constitutes a real distinction between the persons?  
 One way of putting the objection is that the merely conceptual distinction 
between the relations and the divine essence implies that the relations are ob-
 
72 ST I.39.1 corpus. 
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jectionably mind-dependent. This objection threatens a conflict between Aqui-
nas’ account of relational distinction and the background assumption that the 
Trinity claims describe mind-independent features of God.73  
 Aquinas’ analogical account of unity has distinctive resources for resolving 
this particular objection. For note that the claim that divine relations differ from the 
divine essence only in ‘meaning’ or ‘concept’ (rationem tantum), renders the Trinity 
objectionably mind-dependent only if it is also the case that the concepts in 
question are purely in the mind, and not grounded in an appropriate way in 
extramental reality. However, Aquinas’ account of unity is inseparable from his 
account of being, and the plurality of senses of being is in turn based upon a plu-
rality of mind-independent modes of being.74 For Aquinas, then, the claim that 
the distinct relations differ only in concept from the divine substance or essence, 
is not grounded in a partly or wholly conventional plurality of human ways of 
conceptualizing. Rather, it is ultimately grounded in mind-independent modes 
of being in God. Thus, Aquinas can say that, while the concept of a divine rela-
tion is only in the mind, “there is in reality something [in God] corresponding 
to it in which it is founded.”75  
 However, this leads to a further way of pressing the objection, namely, 
that real distinction arguably requires a distinction between things which do not 
wholly overlap in being or esse in the way that Aquinas’ minimalist ontology of 
divine relations implies.76 The principle that real distinction requires a distinc-
tion between entities of a more robust sort than Aquinas’ divine relations, is 
voiced in an objection from Aquinas’ commentary on Sentences I.2.1, which ap-
peals to the principle that real distinction must be between distinct things (rather 
than simply the aspects of, or relations within, a given thing):  
 
73 One version of this objection is found in Michael Rea’s objection to Peter Geach’s 
relative identity theory of the Trinity (“Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trin-
ity,” in Thomas McCall and Michael C. Rea (eds.), Philosophical and Theological Essays on 
the Trinity [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009], 260).  
74 DV I.1 corpus.  
75 In Sent. I.33.1.1 ad 3. 
76 For a similar objection, cf. Paasch, “Aquinas on the Trinity,” 77. 
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Augustine says that the three persons are in no way absolutely 
distinguished, but only insofar as they are relative (ad aliquid). A 
thing, however, is not a relation, but is absolute. Therefore it 
seems that the three persons are not things, and thus there is no 
real distinction there.77 
Interestingly, in his reply, Aquinas does not deny the principle that real distinc-
tion is between things. Rather, he denies that thing is restricted only to absolute 
things and does not include relations: 
Thing (res) is among the transcendentals, and that is why it is has 
common application to absolutes and to relatives; and that is 
why there is an essential thing according to which the persons 
do not differ, and a relational or personal thing, according to 
which the persons are distinguished.78 
Aquinas’ claim that thing is among the transcendentals is a reference to its pri-
macy over the Aristotelian categories, and presupposes the possibility of speak-
ing of things simpliciter (substances) as well as things secundum quid (including 
qualities, relations and the like). Aquinas makes this point explicit in his com-
mentary on Sentences I.25.1, where he claims that “it is from quiddity that the 
name thing (res) is derived.”79 This, in turn, allows for a simpliciter/secundum quid 
characterization of thing, because quiddity in turn admits of a simpliciter/secundum 
quid characterization, one which can be found in God: 
If by ‘quiddity’ we mean not only the nature absolutely (natura 
absoluta), but the ratio or intention of some substance, accident or 
relation, in that case, although there is in God only one quiddity 
absolutely, nevertheless, there are several rationes of real rela-
tions, and so in a certain way, several quiddities, although this 
cannot be conceded strictly speaking: because quiddity, essence and 
definition is only of substances simpliciter, as Aristotle proves, and 
 
77 In Sent. I.2.1.5 obj. 2. 
78 In Sent. I.2.1.5 ad 2. For a similar statement cf. ST I.39.3 ad 3; DP 9.5 ad 14. 
79 In Sent. I.25.1.4 corpus.  
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it is in this sense that the name ‘thing’ can be predicated plurally 
and singly.80 
In this passage, Aquinas affirms that the plurality of things in God is grounded 
in a plurality of quiddities secundum quid, while the existence of just one thing in 
God can also be affirmed in virtue of there being one quiddity simpliciter corre-
sponding to the divine substance. The analogical nature of thing corresponds to 
Aquinas’ analogical account of relational distinction and substantial distinction. 
While Aquinas does not explicitly speak here of real distinction in analogical terms, 
his appeal to real distinction as between things (in light of the analogy of thing) sug-
gests the following reading of Aquinas’ claims about real distinction in the Trin-
ity: Real distinction between the divine relations is secundum quid insofar as it is a 
distinction between things secundum quid; there is no real distinction between 
the divine essence and anything (including the persons) simpliciter, in view of the 
divine essence’s status as the one thing simpliciter in God.81 
 In short, Aquinas’ strategy for avoiding contradiction between his affirma-
tion of real distinction on the one hand, and his minimalist ontology of divine 
relations on the other, is to qualify his predication of real distinction between the 
divine persons, so that it contains no implication of any distinction between en-
tities other than relations, nor any need to posit additional entities over and 
above the simple divine essence.  
 In closing this section, it is worth acknowledging that the plausibility of 
Aquinas’ strategies for resolving tension between unity and distinction of the 
divine persons as outlined here, ultimately hinges on issues which this paper has 
not tried to cover, such as the plausibility of Aquinas’ ontology of relations and 
his broader analogical semantics of being and unity. My focus in this section has 
 
80 In Sent. I.25.1.4 ad 2. 
81 This understanding of real distinction provides a basis for Aquinas’ affirmation else-
where that the real distinction of divine persons is the “most minimal” real distinction 
that there can be, due to the fact that relation is the “most minimal being” (In Sent. 
I.26.2.2 ad 2; cf. DP 8.1 ad 4).  
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been not on the plausibility but rather the coherence of Aquinas’ reading of the 
Trinity claims. I have argued that Aquinas is careful to affirm a relational dis-
tinction of persons which does not posit any division or addition of esse in the 
divine substance. Furthermore, he endorses a semantics of real distinction flexible 
enough to encompass not only distinction at the level of esse in God, but also 
relational distinction. These strategies enable Aquinas to affirm the Trinity 





The goal of this paper has been to show how Aquinas’ account of analogy pro-
vides resources for resolving the prima facie conflict arising from (1) his claim that 
the divine relations, which constitute the persons, are ‘one and the same’ (unum 
et idem) with the divine essence; (2) his insistence on real distinctions between the 
Trinitarian relations, and (3) his affirmation of the absolute simplicity of the di-
vine essence. To achieve this aim, I began with a general discussion of Aquinas’ 
account of analogy, focusing on Aquinas’ account of unity. I have argued that 
Aquinas’s analogical understanding of unity not only dissolves the problem of 
coherence but sheds light on key texts in Aquinas’ account of the Trinity which 
have constituted a puzzle for recent commentators.  
 I have argued that Aquinas’ understanding of analogy enables Aquinas to 
affirm apparently opposed claims, insofar as Aquinas’ simpliciter/secundum quid 
characterization allows for unity to be affirmed and denied of the same thing in 
different senses. In the case of the Trinity claims, this involves affirming that the 
divine persons are one simpliciter, while really distinct (and many) secundum quid. 
 Is the Aquinas’ resolution of logical conflicts in the Trinity one that is ul-
timately satisfying? Whether it is or not will depend on whether philosophers 
and theologians are prepared to accept all the implications which follow from 
an analogical account of key terms like being, unity and distinction. Whether such 
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an account is ultimately defensible is a central question, not only for Trinitarian 
theology, but for metaphysics and philosophical theology more generally. Aqui-
nas’ own position is clear: an analogical approach to being, unity and distinction 
is inseparable from the coherent affirmation of Trinitarian orthodoxy.82 
 






82 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for OSMP for extremely valuable com-
ments on an earlier draft of this paper. I also thank Michael Duncan and Matthew 
Boland OP for their written comments on earlier versions of this paper. My deepest 
debts are to Richard Cross and Michael Tavuzzi OP for numerous rounds of insightful 
suggestion and criticism which clarified the issues in this paper greatly. I benefited from 
presenting an earlier incarnation of the argument of this paper in a thesis submitted at 
the University of Divinity in 2020.  
 
This is the post-peer reviewed version of the following article: 
Chua, Reginald Mary. “Aquinas, Analogy and the Trinity,” Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy, forthcoming.  









Ashworth, E. Jennifer. “Medieval Theories of Analogy,” The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (2017) <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/en-
tries/analogy-medieval/>. 
Ashworth, E.J. “Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aqui-
nas in Context,” Mediaeval Studies 54 (1992), 94–135. 
Bocheński, I.M. “On Analogy,” The Thomist 11 (1948), 424–47. 
Brower, Jeffrey E. “Aquinas on the Problem of Universals,” Philosophy and Phe-
nomenological Research 92 (2015), 715–35. 
Brower, Jeffrey E. Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World: Change, Hylomorphism, 
and Material Objects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
Cross, Richard. “Duns Scotus and Analogy: A Brief Note,” The Modern Schoolman 
89 (2012), 147–54.  
Cross, Richard. Duns Scotus: Great Medieval Thinkers (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999). 
Cross, Richard. “Resemblance and Identity,” in Christophe Erismann (ed.), On 
What There Was: Conceptions of Being 500-1650, East and West, Vol. 3 (Turn-
hout: Brepols, forthcoming). 
D’Ettore, Domenic. Analogy after Aquinas (Washington D.C.: Catholic University 
of America Press, 2018). 
Dolezal, James E. “Trinity, Simplicity and the Status of God’s Personal Rela-
tions,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 16 (2014), 79–98. 
Emery, Gilles. “The Threeness and Oneness of God in Twelfth- to Fourteenth-
Century Scholasticism,” Nova et Vetera 1 (2003), 43–74. 
Emery, Gilles. The Trinitarian Theology of St Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2007). 
Geach, Peter T. “Aquinas,” in Three Philosophers (Oxford: Blackwell, 1961). 
Geach, Peter T. “Identity,” The Review of Metaphysics 21 (1967), 3–12. 
Hochschild, Joshua P. “Aquinas’s Two Concepts of Analogy and a Complex 
Semantics for Naming the Simple God,” The Thomist 83 (2019), 155–84. 
Hochschild, Joshua P. The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan’s De Nominum 
Analogia (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010). 
Hughes, Christopher. Aquinas on Being, Goodness, and God (London: Routledge, 
2015). 
Hughes, Christopher. On A Complex Theory of a Simple God: An Investigation in Aqui-
nas’ Philosophical Theology (London: Cornell University Press, 1989). 
 31 
John Duns Scotus. Opera omnia, ed. C. Balić et al. (Rome: Vatican Press, 1950–
2011). 
John Duns Scotus. Philosophical Writings: A Selection. Translated by Allan B. 
Wolter (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987). 
Kilby, Karen. “Aquinas, the Trinity and the Limits of Understanding,” Interna-
tional Journal of Systematic Theology 7 (2005), 414–27. 
Klima, Gyula. “Aquinas on One and Many,” Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione 
Filosofica Medievale, 11 (2000), 195-215. 
Klima, Gyula. “The Medieval Problem of Universals,” The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (2017) <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/en-
tries/universals-medieval/>. 
Koons, Robert C. “Divine Persons as Relational Qua-Objects,” Religious Studies 
2 (2018), 1–21.  
Lewis, David K. On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1986). 
Loux, Michael J. “Being, Categories, and Universal Reference in Aristotle,” in 
Lila Haaparanta & Heikki Koskinen (eds.), Categories of Being (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 17-35. 
McDaniel, Kris. The Fragmentation of Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017). 
Min, Anselm K. “God as the Mystery of Sharing and Shared Love: Thomas 
Aquinas on the Trinity,” in Peter C. Phan (ed.), The Cambridge Companion 
to the Trinity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 87–107. 
Molnar, George. Powers, ed. Stephen Mumford (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003). 
Molto, Daniel. “The Logical Problem of the Trinity and the Strong Theory of 
Relative Identity,” Sophia 56 (2017), 227–45. 
Mullins, R.T. The End of the Timeless God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017). 
Paasch, J.T. “Aquinas on the Trinity,” in Jeffrey Hause (ed.), Aquinas’s Summa 
Theologiae: A Critical Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2018), 68–87. 
Pasnau, Robert. “On What There Is in Aquinas,” in Jeffrey Hause (ed.), Aqui-
nas’s Summa Theologiae: A Critical Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2018), 10–28. 
Peterson, Anne Siebels. “Unity, Plurality, and Hylomorphic Composition in Ar-
istotle’s Metaphysics,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 103 (2017), 1–13. 
Price, Huw. Naturalism without Mirrors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
Quine, Willard Van Orman. “On What There Is,” Review of Metaphysics 2 (1948), 
21–38. 
Rea, Michael Cannon. “Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity,” in 
Thomas McCall and Michael C. Rea (eds.), Philosophical and Theological 
Essays on the Trinity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 249–62. 
Rescher, Nicholas. Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range, and Resolution, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 
IL: Open Court, 2001). 
 32 
Rocca, Gregory P. Speaking the Incomprehensible God (Washington D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2014). 
Sefrin-Weis, Heike. “Pros Hen And The Foundations Of Aristotelian Meta-
physics,” in John J. Cleary and Gary M. Gurtler (eds.), Proceedings of the 
Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 24 (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 261–
85. 
Shields, Christopher J. Order in Multiplicity: Homonymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
Smith, Timothy L. Thomas Aquinas’ Trinitarian Theology: A Study in Theological 
Method (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2003). 
Thomas Aquinas. S. Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia (Rome: Com-
missio Leonina). 1882-. 
Thomas Aquinas. Corpus Thomisticum, ed. Enrique Alarcón and Roberto Busa 
(Navarre: Fundación Tomás de Aquino, 2000-11). www.corpusthomis-
ticum.org 
Thomas Aquinas. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, magistri Petri Lombardi, ed. R.P. 
Mandonnet and M. F. Moos (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929–47). 
Thomas Aquinas. In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, ed. M. R. 
Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi, 2nd ed. (Rome: Marietti, 1971). 
Thomas Aquinas. Liber de veritate catholicae Fidei contra errores infidelium seu Summa 
contra Gentiles, ed. P. Marc et al. (Rome: Marietti, 1961). 
Thomas Aquinas. Quaestiones disputatae de potentia, ed. P.M. Pession, 10th ed. 
(Rome: Marietti, 1965). 
Te Velde, Rudi A. “The Divine Person(s): Trinity, Person, and Analogous Nam-
ing,” in Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering (eds.), The Oxford Handbook 
of the Trinity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1–14. 
 
